SPEECH 


OP 


- 


MR.  CALEB  B,  .SMITH,  OF  INDIANA, 


ON 


THE  WAR  AND  ITS  COST. 


DELIVERED  IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES  OF  THE  U.  STATES, 

FEBRUARY  3,  1848. 


WASHINGTON: 

PRINTED    BY    J.    &    G.    S.    GIDEON. 

1848. 


Bancroft  Ubrmry 

SPEECH 


MR.  CALEB  B.  SMITH,  of  Indiana,  being  entitled  to  the  floor,  on  the  question  of  referring 
the  various  parts  of  the  President's  Message  to  the  several  standing  committees,  addressed  the 
House  as  follows : 
MR.  SPEAKER: 

I  shall  not  consume  any  portion  of  my  time  in  discussing  the  origin  of  the 
war  with  Mexico.  That  question  has  been  very  ably  and  thoroughly  discussed, 
n  not  only  at  this  session,  but  during  the  last  Congress.  The  members  of  this 
House,  and  the  country,  are  in  possession  of  all  the  information  necessary  to 
enable  them  to  form  conclusions  satisfactory  to  themselves.  I  have  only  to 
say,  in  regard  to  this  matter,  that  this  House  has  decided,  during  the  present 
session,  upon  a  solemn  and  deliberate  vote  by  yeas  and  nays,  that  the  war  with 
the  Republic  of  Mexico,  in  which  we  are  now  engaged,  was  "unnecessarily 
and  unconstitutionally  commenced  by  the  President  of  the  United  States."  I  had 
the  good  fortune — and  I  deem  it  extreme  good  fortune — to  have  the  opportu 
nity  of  recording  my  vote  in  favor  of  this  sentence  of  condemnation.  In  giving 
that  vote,  my  heart  concurred  with  my  judgment;  and  I  desire  to  say  no  more 
at  this  time,  in  regard  to  the  origin  of  the  war,  than  to  express  my  concurrence 
with  the  decision  so  solemnly  made  by  this  House.  It  is  a  decision  which,  ia 
my  deliberate  judgment,  the  country  will  sustain  and  approve.  Whatever  may 
be  the  opinions  of  individuals  who,  influenced  by  partisan  feelings,  may  be  dis 
posed  to  justify  all  that  the  President  has  done  or  may  do,  when  party  excite 
ment  shall  have  been  dissipated  by  time,  and  the  impartial  pen  of  history  shall 
\  have  recorded  the  facts,  the  matured  judgment  of  the  American  people  will 
sanction  that  vote  of  condemnation. 

But  I  desire  at  this  time  to  speak  more  particularly  in  reference  to  questions 
of  more  practical  utility — questions  which  concern  the  future  rather  than  the 
.  past.  However  this  war  may  have  commenced,  on  whomsoever  shall  rest  the 
responsibility  of  its  origin,  we  are  in  the  midst  of  it;  its  evils  are  now  pressing 
upon  us,  paralyzing  the  energies  of  the  country,  drying  up  its  resources,  and 
wasting  its  best  blood.  It  becomes  us,  the  representatives  of  the  American 
people,  sent  here  to  deliberate  upon  questions  affecting  their  interests,  calmly 
and  dispassionately  to  deliberate,  and  consider  whether  some  means  may  not  be 
devised,  by  which  this  war  may  be  terminated,  and  its  calamitous  consequences 
arrested. 

The  financial  affairs  of  the  country  are  at  all  times  interesting,  and  demand 
our  attention.  They  become  doubly  so  in  time  of  war,  when  our  expenditures 
are  greatly  increased  without  any  corresponding  increase  of  revenue.  Gentle 
men  on  the  other  side  of  the  House  sometimes  charge  those  who  oppose  the 
Administration  with  being  in  favor  of  the  accumulation  of  a  national  debt.  If 
there  are  any  who  desire  the  increase  of  our  public  debt,  they  are  likely  to  be 
gratified  to  the  fullest  extent  of  their  wishes.  I  shall  take  care  to  show  that 
such  a  charge  can  have  no  application  to  me.  I  regard  the  accumulation  of  a 
national  debt  as  an  evil  of  the  most  serious  magnitude,  and  one  which  every 
consideration  of  duty  and  patriotism  requires  us  as  far  as  possible  to  avert. 

The  effect  of  the  Mexican  war  upon  our  financial  condition,  and  the  rapid 
augmentation  of  our  public  debt  which  it  is  likely  to  produce,  have  not,  in  my 
opinion,  received  the  attention  their  importance  merits.  We  have  now  upon 
our  tables  a  bill  which  proposes  to  add  eighteen  and  a  half  millions  of  dollars  to 
our  public  debt,  and  which  the  honorable  Chairman  of  the  Committee  of  Ways 

t±- *t  a  -T ' 


and  Means  has  given  us  notice  he  intends  to  call  up  in  a  few  days.  The 
amount  of  the  public  debt  at  the  commencement  of  the  present  session  of  Con 
gress,  as  we  were  informed  by  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
was  $45,659,659.40.  To  what  amount  is  it  to  be  increased?  The  President 
has  already  recommended  loans  to  the  amount  of  thirty -nine  millions,  viz., 
eighteen  and  a  half  millions  for  the  residue  of  the  present  fiscal  year,  and 
twenty  and  a  half  millions  for  the  next  year.  This  additional  amount  of  loans 
we  are  told  will  be  necessary  to  prosecute  the  war  until  the  close  of  the  next 
fiscal  year,  ending:  on  the  30th  June,  1849.  Thus  we  have  in  prospective,  on 
the  30th  June,  1849,  according  to  the  estimates  of  the  President  and  his  Cabi 
net,  a  public  debt  amounting  to  the  sum  of  $84,659,659.40.  This  looks  like 
an  amount  of  debt  which  should  cause  the  people  to  reflect,  even  if  confidence 
could  be  placed  in  the  estimates  of  the  Executive  departments  that  it  would 
be  no  more.  But  an  examination  of  those  estimates  must  satisfy  every  one 
who  will  examine  them  that  they  are  wride  of  the  mark.  Ever  since  the  com 
mencement  of  the  war,  the  country  has  been  deceived  by  false  estimates — false 
estimates  of  the  amount  of  loans  necessary,  false  estimates  of  the  receipts  ot 
the  Government,  and  false  estimates  of  its  expenditures.  The  official  reports 
now  before  us  prove  the  estimates  heretofore  made  to  be  false;  how,  then,  can 
those  now  presented  command  our  confidence?  At  the  commencement  of  the 
last  session  of  Congress,  the  President,  in  his  annual  message,  speaking  of  the 
loan  necessary  for  the  prosecution  of  the  war,  said : 

"  If  the  war  should  be  continued  until  the  thirtieth  of  June,  1848,  being  the  end  of  the  next 
fiscal  year,  it  is  estimated  that  an  additional  loan  of  twenty-three  millions  of  dollars  will  be  re 
quired.  This  estimate  is  made  upon  the  assumption  that  it  will  be  necessary  to  retain  con 
stantly  in  the  Treasury  four  millions  of  dollars  to  guard  against  contingencies.  If  such  surplus 
were  not  required  to  be  retained,  then  a  loan  of  nineteen  millions  of  dollars  would  be  sufficient." 

The  country  was  thus  assured  that  a  loan  of  twenty-three  millions  would  be 
all  the  Government  would  require  to  enable  it  to  prosecute  the  war  until  the 
30th  June,  1848,  and  still  retain  four  millions  in  the  Treasury  as  a  constant 
surplus.  Well,  sir,  Congress  authorized  the  loan  asked  for — the  twenty-three 
millions,  besides  five  millions  authorized  by  a  previous  act,  have  all  been  ob 
tained;  and  yet,  at  the  commencement  of  the  present  session  of  Congress,  the 
President  asks  for  an  additional  loan  of  eighteen  and  a  half  millions  to  enable 
him  to  prosecute  the  war  to  the  end  of  the  present  fiscal  year,  30th  June,  1848. 
I  present  here  a  short  extract  from  his  message : 

"Retaining  a  sufficient  surplus  in  the  Treasury,  the  loan  required  for  the  remainder  of  the 
present  fiscal  year  (ending  30th  June,  1848)  will  be  about  eighteen  million  five  hundred  thou 
sand  dollars." 

The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  in  his  report,  informs  us  that  it  is  expected 
to  retain  in  the  Treasury  only  three  millions,  instead  of  four,  as  stated  in  the 
report  of  last  year.  Then,  if  we  add  to  the  eighteen  and  a  half  millions  asked 
fbr,  the  million  taken  from  the  surplus  estimated  to  be  in  the  Treasury,  it  ap 
pears  that  the  estimate  of  loans  of  the  last  session  fell  short  of  the  amount  re 
quired,  nineteen  and  a  half  millions  of  dollars.  I  should  be  much  pleased  if 
some  friend  of  the  Administration  would  inform  us  how  this  gross  blunder  has 
been  made.  Are  we  to  attribute  it  to  the  errors  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Trea 
sury?  Is  his  judgment,  in  regard  to  the  finances  of  the  country,  so  poor  that 
he  is  liable  to  fall  into  such  glaring  errors?  Or  has  there  been  an  attempt  to 
cover  up  and  conceal  from  the  country  the  enormous  expenses  of  the  war,  and 
the  alarming  national  debt  it  is  creating?  I  care  not  which  horn  of  the  dilemma 
the  Administration  and  its  friends  may  choose;  in  either  case  it  is  conclusively 
shown  that  no  confidence  can  be  placed  in  the  estimates  emanating  from  that 
source. 

But  the  estimates  now  made  by  the  Treasury  Department  show,  that  the  pub 
lic  debt  on  the  30th  of  June,  1849,  will  amount  to  over  eighty -four  millions  of 


dollars.  The  estimate  is  made  on  the  assumption  that  the  Government  will  re 
ceive  all  the  revenue  estimated  in  the  Secretary's  report,  and  will  be  required 
to  expend  only  the  amount  there  estimated.  But  it  will  be  seen,  on  examina 
tion,  that  these  estimates  of  receipts  and  expenditures  are  entitled  to  as  little 
credit  as  the  estimate  of  loans,  made  last  year.  Let  us  look  at  the  estimates 
of  receipts  and  expenditures  for  the  last  year,  and  compare  them  with  the 
amounts,  as  shown  by  the  reports.  The  Secretary,  in  his  annual  report,  in 
December,  1846,  estimated  the  receipts  for  the  year  ending  30th  June,  1847, 
at  $31,335,731.00.  The  actual  receipts,  as  shown  by  the  official  report,  were 
$26,346,790.37,  showing  a  deficiency  of  $4,988,940.63 — almost  five  millions. 
He  estimated  the  expenditures  for  the  same  year  at  $55,241,21*2.09,  while  the 
report  shows  that  the  actual  expenditures  were  $59,451,177.65 — showing  an 
excess,  beyond  the  estimates,  of  $4,209,965.56  The  report  now  before  us 
proves  that  the  Secretary's  estimates  for  the  last  year  varied  so  far  from  the  true 
•amount  of  receipts  and  expenditures,  as  to  make  a  difference  of  $9,198,906.19. 
Is  it  not  fair  to  presume  that  the  estimates  for  the  present  and  the  ensuing 
year  are  at  least  as  erroneous  as  were  those  for  the  last  year  ?  A  careful 
examination  of  them  will,  in  my  opinion,  show  them  to  be  erroneous  to  a 
much  larger  amount.  But  assuming  them  to  be  erroneous  only  to  the  same 
extent,  then  there  will  be  an  additional  deficiency  of  means,  to  the  amount 
of  $18,397,812.38,  which  must  be  prqvided  for  by  additional  loans,  and  which 
will  swell  the  public  debt,  on  the  30th  June,  1849,  to  the  sum  of  $103,057,- 
471.75 — one  hundred  and  three  millions  of  dollars — a  sum  greatly  beyond 
the  entire  public  debt  occasiond  by  the  late  war  with  Great  Britain.  That  our 
public  debt  will  reach  that  sum  at  that  time  there  cannot  be  a  doubt,  wrhile 
there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  it  will  be  many  millions  beyond  it.  The 
estimates  and  recommendations  of  the  Executive  are  clearly  shown  to  be  en 
titled  to  no  credit.  At  the  commencement  of  the  session,  the  President  and 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  both  stated  that  a  loan  of  eighteen  and  a  half 
millions  would  be  required  for  the  residue  of  the  present  year.  A  few  weeks 
afterwards,  the  Secretary  ad  interim  informed  us  that  a  mistake  had  been  dis 
covered  in  the  annual  report,  by  which  the  means  of  the  Treasury  were  esti 
mated  at  near  seven  millions  of  dollars  less  than  the  true  amount,  and  that 
they  then  had  means  to  the  amount  of  near  seven  millions  beyond  the  amount 
stated  in  the  report.  Upon  this  important  discovery,  he  recommended  that 
the  loan  before  requested  should  be  reduced  to  twelve  millions.  But  scarce 
ly  had  the  report  containing  this  information  been  printed,  when  we  were 
again  informed  by  the  Secretary,  that  the  previous  estimates  were  erroneous, 
and  that  it  was  now  found  necessary  to  raise  the  loan  to  sixteen  millions.  Was 
ever  such  a  series  of  blunders  and  errors  before  witnessed  ?  I  venture  the 
prediction,  that,  before  this  session  of  Congress  closes,  we  shall  be  called  upon 
to  authorize  additional  loans,  notwithstanding  the  assurances  of  the  President 
to  the  contrary.  The  loan  now  asked  for  will  be  found  insufficient  to  meet  the 
-extraordinary  expenditures  we  are  incurring. 

But,  Mr.  Speaker,  taking  the  estimates  of  the  President  and  his  Secretary 
as  correct,  with  the  exception  of  an  allowance  for  errors  in  the  estimates  for 
this  and  the  next  year,  equal  to  that  which  the  report  shows  to  have  existed 
in  the  estimates  for  the  last  year,  and  our  public  debt  on  the  30th  of  June,  1849, 
will  be  over  one  hundred  and  three  millions  of  dollars,  upon  which  we  shall 
have  to  pay  an  annual  interest  of  $6,183,448.26.  It  becomes  a  matter  of 
grave  interest  to  inquire  how  this  debt  is  to  be  paid.  From  what  source  are 
the  funds  to  be  raised  annually  to  meet  the  large  amount  of  interest  ?  I  should 
be  extremely  happy  to  hear  some  gentleman,  who  understands  and  approves 
the  financiering  of  this  Administration,  explain  to  us  how  the  heavy  obligations 
we  are  incurring  are  to  be  met  and  cancelled, 


6 

The  loan  bill  of  the  last  session  of  Congress  pledges  the  proceeds  of  the 
public  lands  for  the  payment  of  the  interest  and  the  redemption  of  the  princi 
pal  of  the  public  debt.  Does  any  gentleman  suppose  that  we  can  avail  our 
selves  of  anything  from  that  source  to  meet  the  accruing  interest  for  several 
years  ?  A  slight  examination  of  the  subject  must  dissipate  all  such  hopes. 
Before  the  war  commenced — when  the  country  was  on  the  peace  establish 
ment,  and  when  its  commercial,  manufacturing,  and  agricultural  interests 
were  all  prosperous,  only  between  two  and  three  millions  a  year  were  received 
from  the  public  lands.  If  the  receipts  should  continue  as  large  after  the  war 
as  they  were  before,  can  we  expect  to  pay  an  interest  amounting  to  six  mil 
lions  of  dollars  from  this  source?  But  let  me  inquire,  what  revenue  are  we  like 
ly  to  derive  from  the  public  lands  hereafter  ?  The  last  Congress,  after  pledg 
ing  the  proceeds  of  the  public  lands  to  the  redemption  of  the  public  debt,  voted, 
away  sixteen  millions  of  acres  as  a  bounty  to  the  soldiers  engaged  in  the  war. 
I  make  no  objection  to  the  bounty  thus  granted.  It  received  my  approbation 
and  my  vote.  I  was  entirely  willing  to  accord  to  the  brave  men  who  perilled 
their  lives  in  this  war,  and  to  the  families  of  those  who  perished  in  its  prosecu 
tion,  the  bounty  which  they  merited.  But  I  do  object  seriously  to  the  conduct 
of  that  Congress  in  providing  no  other  means  to  meet  the  payment  of  the  debt 
they  were  creating.  I  protest  against  this  mode  of  deluding  the  country  into 
the  belief  that  a  fund  has  been  provided  to  meet  the  interest  on  the  public  debt, 
•when  that  fund  is  already  dissipated,  and  can  amount  to  nothing.  The  number 
of  claims  for  bounty  land,  which  will  exist  under  the  act  of  the  last  Congress, 
if  the  additional  forces  now  asked  for  by  the  Executive  shall  be  called  into  the 
field,  will  not  be  short  of  one  hundred  thousand.  These  will  draw  sixteen 
millions  of  acres  of  land,  which,  at  the  minimum  price  of  the  Government,  will 
amount  to  twenty  millions  of  dollars.  Assuming  that  the  sales  of  public  lands 
•will  reach  three  millions  of  dollars  a  year,  it  will  require  nearly  seven  years 
to  absorb  these  warrants,  and  during  that  period  our  revenue  from  that  source 
must  be  almost  entirely  cut  off. 

How,  then,  I  would  ask  again,  are  we  to  meet  this  rapidly  accumulating  in 
terest  ?  There  is  but  one  way  in  my  opinion,  and  that  is,  by  a  resort  to  direct 
taxation;  and  to  this  we  are  rapidly  approximating.  If  this  war  is  to  be  con 
tinued,  direct  taxation  cannot  be  avoided.  We  have  already  reached  a  crisis 
which  appeals  strongly  to  the  patriotism  of  those  who  brought  the  war  upon  the 
country — those  who  stand  by  the  Administration,  and  defend  its  policy  and  its 
measures — to  assume  the  responsibility  which  their  own  measures  have  cre 
ated,  and  impose  upon  the  people  the  burdens  necessary  to  meet  the  enormous 
expenditures  which  the  prosecution  of  the  war  requires.  Do  gentlemen  sup 
pose  that  a  war  can  be  continued  year  after  year,  with  no  other  object  than  to 
gratify  the  ambitious  designs  of.  our  rulers,  upon  credit  and  loans  alone,  with 
out  providing  the  means  of  meeting  even  the  interest  of  the  debt  thus  created  ? 
And  if  it  could  be,  is  it  just,  is  it  honest,  or  honorable,  to  impose  upon  the  gen 
eration  to  succeed  us,  a  heavy  amount  of  public  debt,  while  we  meanly  shrink 
from  taxing  ourselves  ?  If  we  create  a  national  debt,  we  ought  to  provide  the 
means  of  its  extinguishment.  This  has  always  been  regarded  as  of  the  utmost 
importance  to  the  credit  of  a  nation.  I  will  beg  leave  to  call  the  attention  of 
the  House  to  a  short  extract  from  the  first  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Trea 
sury,  under  the  administration  of  Washington,  in  which  this  principle  is  re 
commended  and  enforced  : 

"  Incorporating;  as  a  fundamental  maxim  in  the  system  of  public  credit  of  the  United  States, 
that  the  creation  of  debt  should  ahcays  be  accompanied  with  the  means  of  extinguishment ;  that  this 
is  the  true  secret  for  render  ing  public  credit  immortal;  and  that  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  a  situation  in 
which  there  may  not  be  an  adherence  to  the  maxim." 

The  principle  here  laid  down  is  one  which  should  never  be  lost  sight  of.     If 


this  war  shall  be  continued,  and  the  credit  of  the  Government  shall  be  alone 
looked  to  to  raise  the  means  necessary  to  its  prosecution,  it  requires  no  prophet 
to  foretell,  that  the  stocks  of  the  Government  will  be  hawked  through  the  money 
marts  of  the  country  at  a  depreciation,  while  purchasers  will  be  extremely  dif 
ficult  to  find. 

I  have  thus  attempted,  Mr.  Speaker,  to  show  what  will  be  the  probable 
amount  of  our  public  debt  at  the  end  of  the  next  fiscal  year.  The  amount  at 
which  I  have  placed  it  I  am  sensible  is  low,  and  I  believe  greatly  below  what 
it  will  be.  But  if  it  shall  be  ho  more,  it  is  sufficiently  large  to  call  the  serious 
attention  of  the  country  to  the  subject.  It  will  fall  but  little,  if  any,  short  of 
the  highest  point  of  our  public  debt  at  any  time  since  the  adoption  of  the  Con 
stitution.  The  public  debt  on  the  30th  September,  1815,  after  the  close  of  the 
late  war  with  Great  Britain,  was  $119,635,558.46.  This  was  the  largest 
amount  our  public  debt  has  ever  reached.  Of  this  sum,  the  debt  created  by 
the  late  war  with  Great  Britain  was  $80,500,073.50.  The  residue  was  the 
debt  existing  before  the  commencement  of  the  war. 

Gentlemen  on  the  other  side  of  the  House  seem  to  be  fond  of  comparing  the 
Mexican  war  to  the  war  of  1812.  There  is  at  least  one  striking  difference  be 
tween  the  course  pursued  by  the  friends  and  supporters  of  the  two  wars.  The 
friends  of  the  last  war,  in  Congress,  were  willing  to  meet  the  crisis  like  men. 
They  did  not  rely  upon  public  credit  alone  to  raise  the  means  to  prosecute  it, 
but  appealed  to  their  constituents  to  pay  the  taxes  necessary  for  that  purpose. 
In  the  first  year  of  the  war  they  doubled  the  duties  on  foreign  imports  ;  while 
the  supporters  of  the  Mexican  war  have,  since  its  commencement,  reduced 
them  nearly  one  half.  They  also  passed  a  law,  immediately  after  the  war  was 
declared,  to  raise  one  million  seven  hundred  and  twenty-five  thousand  dollars 
by  internal  duties,  and  three  millions  by  direct  taxes  among  the  States.  If 
these  measures  were  necessary  then,  they  are  doubly  so  now,  when  the  ex 
penses  of  the  Government  are  so  far  greater  than  they  were  then. 

Those  who  have  not  directed  their  attention  to  this  subject  will  be  astonished 
at  the  vast  amount  of  the  expenses  of  this  war,  when  compared  with  those  of 
the  war  of  1812.  Let  me  compare  them.  The  expenses  of  the  Government 
from  the  31st  December,  1811,  to  the  same  date  in  1812,  were  $17,829,498 
70.  From  the  31st  December,  1812,  to  the  same  day  of  1813,  the  expenses 
were  $28,082,396.92.  From  31st  December,  1813,  to  the  same  day  of  1814, 
they  were  $30,127,686.38.  This  statement  embraces  the  entire  expenditures 
of  the  Government  for  those  periods,  including  both  the  war  expenses  and  the 
civil  list.  Thus,  it  appears,  that  the  entire  expenses  of  the  Government  for  a 
period  of  three  years,  embracing  the  whole  period  of  the  late  war  with  Great 
Britain,  were  $76,039,582.20.  Now,  let  us  compare  this  amount  with  the 
expenditures  for  an  equal  period  of  the  Mexican  war.  The  expenditures  from 
the  30th  June,  1846,  to  30th  June,  1847,  as  shown  by  the  Secretary's  report, 
were  $59,451,177.65.  For  the  year  from  the  30th  June,  1847,  to  30th  June, 
1848,  they  are  estimated  by  the  Secretary  at  $58,615,660.07.  And  for  the 
year  ending  30th  June,  1849,  they  are  estimated  at  $55,644,941.72.  Making 
an  aggregate  for  the  three  years  of  $173,711,779.44;  being  an  excess  of 
$97,672,197.44  over  the  expenditures  of  the  three  years  embracing  the  whole 
period  of  the  late  war.  This  comparison  is  made  upon  the  estimates  of  the 
Secretary,  of  the  expenses  of  two  out  of  the  three  years.  And  yet,  upon  his 
own  showing,  the  expenses  will  now  exceed,  by  nearly  one  hundred  millions, 
those  of  the  previous  period. 

I  wish,  however,  to  recur  again  to  the  estimates  of  the  expenditures  for  the 
present  and  the  next  fiscal  year.  The  Secretary  estimates  the  expenditures 
for  the  present  year  at  less  than  those  of  the  last,  and  the  expenditures  of  the 
next  year  at  less  than  those  of  the  present.  The  expenditures  for  the  year 


8 

ending  30th  June,  1847 — the  first  year  of  the  war — were  about  fifty-nine  mil 
lions  and  a  half,  and  they  are  estimated  for  the  present  year  at  about  fifty - 
,eight  millions  and  a  half,  and  for  the  next  year  at  about  fitty-five  and  a  half 
millions.  The  Secretary  thus  informs  us  that  the  war  will  cost  less  by  a  mil 
lion  this  year  than  it  cost  the  last,  and  that  next  year  it  will  cost  about  five 
millions  less.  Can  such  estimates  as  these  command  any  confidence?  Can 
-any  man  of  ordinary  intelligence  believe,  that  as  the  war  progresses  its  ex 
penses  will  be  diminished?  The  reverse  of  this  must  be  the  case.  Each 
year  that  the  war  continues  its  expenses  will  increase.  Such  was  the  case 
during  the  late  war.  The  expenses  of  the  second  year  were  higher  than  those 
of  the  first,  and  of  the  third  year  they  were  still  higher.  Time  will  prove 
that  it  will  be  so  with  the  Mexican  war.  I  should  be  glad  to  be  informed  upon 
what  data  the  Secretary  has  made  this  estimate  of  diminished  expenditures. 
Are  we  to  have  fewer  men  in  the  field  than  we  had  last  year?  The  President 
tells  us  the  number  must  be  largely  increased.  Has  the  pay  of  the  army  been 
reduced?  Have  the  rations  of  the  officers  or  troops  been  diminished?  Have 
any  of  the  requisites  belonging  to  any  branch  of  the  service  been  curtailed? 
Has  any  thing  been  done  to  curtail  or  diminish  any  of  the  expenses  of  the 
war?  Nothing — absolutely  nothing;  and  yet,  according  to  the  reasoning  of  the 
President  and  his  Secretary,  wre  may  go  on  to  raise  new  armies,  and  all  the 
while  the  expenses  will  be  diminished.  The  President  insists  that  we  shall 
authorize  him  to  call  into  the  field  thirty  thousand  more  troops,  while  at  the 
.same  time  he  assures  us  that  the  expenses  of  the  war  will  be  diminished. 
Was  any  thing  ever  more  absurd?  And  yet  this  is  the  kind  of  financiering 
which  has  characterized  this  Mexican  war.  From  its  very  commencement  the 
-country  has  been  deceived  and  deluded  by  false  estimates.  A  constant  and 
studied  effort  has  been  made  to  conceal  from  the  people  the  enormous  expense 
it  occasions.  A  national  debt  has  been  steadily  and  stealthily  growing  upon 
ihe  country,  while  by  false  estimates  of  the  amount  of  loans  necessary  for  the 
prosecution  of  the  war,  the  country  has  been  deceived  as  to  the  amount  it  was 
likely  to  reach. 

The  actual  expense  of  the  war  is  far  beyond  the  amount  of  expenditures 
specified  in  the  reports  from  the  Treasury  Department.  Those  reports  present 
us  only  writh  a  statement  of  the  money  actually  paid  out.  We  have  no  means 
of  ascertaining  the  amount  of  unliquidated  claims  against  the  Government  for 
arrearages  of  pay,  munitions  of  war,  wagons,  horses,  mules,  provisions,  and 
all  the  long  train  of  supplies  which  an  army  requires,  and  which  must  all  be 
paid  for  ultimately.  These  would  constitute  an  item  of  many  millions  of  dol 
lars.  In  addition  to  this  a  very  heavy  item  of  expense  is  to  be  found  in  the  use 
of  the  materiel  of  Avar  wath  which  our  arsenals  were  filled.  Before  the  com 
mencement  of  the  war  these  were  well  stored  with  all  the  munitions  of  war — 
with  every  variety  of  cannon  and  small  arms,  and  every  thing  requisite  for 
offensive  and  defensive  warfare — the  accumulations  of  thirty  years  of  peace. 
All  this  being  property  owned  by  the  Government,  has  been  used,  but  does  not 
appear  in  any  statement  of  the  expenditures.  The  amount  of  property  thus 
used  cannot  amount  to  less  than  five  millions  of  dollars,  and  in  all  probability 
to  a  much  larger  sum.  Then  we  have  the  claims  for  bounty  lands,  which,  as 
I  have  before  stated,  if  the  troops  now  asked  for,  shall  be  called  out,  will 
amount  to  twenty  millions  of  dollars;  aii(J,  with  those  heretofore  called  out, 
will  not  be  less  than  fourteen  millions.  In  addition  to  this  will  be  the  pension 
list  of  wounded  and  disabled  soldiers,  and  the  families  of  those  who  have  died 
in  the  service,  amounting  to  several  millions  a  year,  and  to  continue  for  nt 
.least  twenty  years.  If  a  treaty  of  peace  were  now  made,  and  our  armies  dis 
banded  as  soon  as  it  will  be  possible  to  disband  them,  the  actual  cost  of  the 
war  to  the  country  would  largely  exceed  one  hundred  millions  of  dollars. 


But,  Mr.  Speaker,  I  desire  to  look  for  a  moment  at  the  prospective  condition 
of  the  country  when  the  war  shall  be  brought  to  a  close,  if  we  shall  ever  be 
so  fortunate  as  to  reach  that  pericd.  If  we  shall  reach  the  end  of  the  war  by 
the  close  of  the  next  fiscal  year,  we  shall  then,  as  I  think  I  have  clearly 
shown,  have  a  public  debt  of  over  one  hundred  millions  of  dollars,  with  an 
annual  interest  of  over  six  millions.  I  would  again  ask,  how  are  we  to  meet  this? 

The  gentleman  from  North  Carolina,  (Mr.  McKAY,)  whose  services  for  sev 
eral  years  as  Chairman  of  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means  may  give  to 
his  opinions  additional  weight,  stated  to  the  House  a  few  days  ago,  that  after 
the  war  shall  be  ended  the  revenues  of  the  Government  will  be  sufficient  to 
pay  its  expenses,  and  the  interest  upon  the  public  debt,  without  additional  taxa 
tion.  Is  that  opinion  correct?  Let  us  look  at  a  few  facts,  calculated  to  throw 
light  upon  this  subject.  The  entire  receipts  of  the  Government  for  the  year 
ending  30th  June,  1846 — being  the  last  year  before  the  war — were  $29,499,- 
247.06.  That  amount  was  raised  thus:  from  customs,  $26,712,667.87;  from 
public  lands,  $2,694,452.48;  and  miscellaneous,  $92,126.71.  The  expendi 
tures  for  the  same  year,  were  $28,031,114.20.  This  was  the  amount  of  the 
expenditures  for  a  peace  establishment,  (for  although  the  war  was  commenced  a 
few  weeks  before  the  close  of  that  fiscal  year,  the  war  expenses  are  brought 
into  the  accounts  of  the  next  year,)  and  when  this  Democratic  Administration 
was  carrying  out  its  professions  of  reform  and  retrenchment.  And  yet  the 
entire  receipts  of  the  Government  exceeded  its  expenditures  only  by  the  sum 
of  $1,418,132.86.  If  the  receipts  exceeded  the  expenditures  then  by  only 
that  small  sum,  how  can  we  expect  them,  after  the  war  shall  be  closed,  to 
meet  the  expenses  of  the  Government,  and  pay  in  addition  six  millions  of  in 
terest?  Does  the  gentleman  from  North  Carolina  suppose  that  the  expendi 
tures  of  the  Government  will  be  less  after  the  war  than  they  were  before?  He 
•surely  has  too  much  sagacity  to  entertain  such  an  opinion.  The  gentleman 
surely  must  know  that  our  expenses  will  be  much  greater  after  the  war  than 
they  were  before.  Can  any  one  tell  how  long  it  will  require  to  get  rid  of  our 
large  army,  or  to  reduce  it  to  the  numbers  it  filled  before  the  war?  Sir,  no 
member  of  this  House  will  live  to  see  it  reduced  to  the  standard  it  occupied 
before  the  war  commenced.  Let  this  war  end  when  and  how7  it  may,  we  are 
doomed  to  have  a  large  military  force  fastened  upon  the  country.  The  ex 
penses  of  the  Government  must  be  greatly  increased.  But  let  us  see  how  the 
account  stands  for  the  next  year.  The  entire  revenues  for  the  year  ending 
30th  June,  1847,  were  $26,346,790.37.  The  expenditures  for  the  same  pe 
riod,  were  $59,451,177.65.  Of  this  amount  there  is  charged  in  the  Secreta 
ry's  report  to  "Mexican  hostilities,"  $18,365,518.03;  for  pay  to  volunteers 
and  militia,  $1,368,709.40;  for  the  redemption  of  loan  and  treasury  notes, 
$2,402,817.65;  which  leaves  for  other  expenses,  $37,314,123.57,  being  an 
excess  over  the  revenue  of  $10,967,333.20. 

[Mr.  McKAY  inquired  from  what  source  the  gentleman  from  Indiana  ob 
tained  his  statistics?] 

Mr.  SMITH  replied  that  he  took  them  as  he  found  them  in  the  report  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 

Here,  then,  said  Mr.  SMITH,  is  an  excess  of  expenditure  in  one  year,  over 
the  revenues,  of  nearly  eleven  millions  of  dollars.  Upon  what  ground,  then, 
can  any  gentleman  believe  that,  after  the  war  shall  end,  we  can  meet  the  ex 
penses  of  the  Government,  and  pay  over  six  millions  of  interest,  without  addi 
tional  taxation?  It  will  be  impossible,  after  the  war  shall  be  terminated,  to  re 
duce  the  expenses  of  the  Government  below  thirty-five  millions  of  dollars. 
Add  to  this,  six  millions  for  interest  on  the  public  debt,  and  we  have  forty-one 
millions  of  dollars  to  be  provided  for.  How  is  it  to  be  met?  Can  we  expect 
to  realize  this  amount  from  duties  on  foreign  goods?  Deprived,  as  we  shall  be, 


10 

of  any  considerable  revenue  from  the  public  lands  for  many  years,  I  do  not  be 
lieve  that  we  shall  be  able  to  realize,  from  all  sources  of  revenue,  without  addi 
tional  taxation,  at  the  utmost  over  thirty  millions  of  dollars,  leaving  eleven 
millions  unprovided  for.  Can  we  expect  the  credit  or  character  of  the  Gov 
ernment  to  be  sustained  under  such  a  system  of  financiering  as  this?  The 
Treasury  notes  and  bonds  of  the  Government  are  at  this  time  selling  at  prices 
below  par  in  our  commercial  cities.  The  quotations  have  been  constantly  be 
low  par  since  the  commencement  of  the  present  session  of  Congress. 

But,  Mr.  Speaker,  I  will  not  trouble  the  House  with  any  further  display  of 
figures.  Those  which  I  have  already  presented,  I  think,  are  sufficient  to  show 
that  our  financial  condition  is  in  an  eminent  degree  embarrassing  from  the  ope 
rations  and  effects  of  the  Mexican  war.  The  rapid  increase  of  our  public  debt 
is  well  calculated  to  excite  serious  alarm.  The  subject  demands  our  most  se 
rious  attention.  We  may  well  take  warning  from  the  example  of  other  na 
tions.  The  tax-ridden  subjects  of  the  government  of  Great  Britain  are  now 
paying  the  penalty  of  the  folly  and  ambition  of  their  rulers.  The  public  debt 
of  Great  Britain  is  now  over  eight  hundred  millions  pounds  sterling,  being  more 
than  four  thousand  millions  of  dollars.  In  order  to  meet  the  interest  on  this 
heavy  amount  of  debt,  (although  the  rate  of  interest  paid  is  but  little  more  than 
half  the  rate  we  are  paying,)  the  government  is  compelled  to  resort  to  an 
amount  of  taxation  which  is  absolutely  ruinous  to  the  laboring  interests  of  the 
country.  The  whole  of  this  vast  debt  has  been  created  within  a  century  and 
a  half.  The  financial  expedients  by  which  governments  have  obtained  money 
upon  the  national  credit,  for  the  prosecution  of  wars,  are  of  modern  origin.  In 
the  earlier  periods  of  history,  the  governments  of  Europe  raised  the  means 
from  year  to  year  for  the  payment  of  the  expenses  of  the  wars  in  which  they 
engaged.  The  generation  which  prosecuted  a  war  defrayed  its  expenses.  It 
was  not  left  as  a  burden  to  clog  the  energies  and  oppress  the  industry  of  a  sub 
sequent  generation. 

The  first  loan  obtained  upon  the  credit  of  the  government  of  Great  Britain 
was  in  1689,  under  the  reign  of  Charles  II.  Since  then  it  has  been  accumu 
lating  with  every  new  war  in  which  the  ambition  or  the  cupidity  of  the  gov 
ernment  involved  the  country,  until  it  has  reached  its  present  enormous  amount. 
Great  Britain  has  extended  her  conquests  into  every  quarter  of  the  globe.  Pro 
vince  after  province  has  been  "  annexed"  to  her  dominions,  until  her  flag  is 
Seen  in  every  clime.  The  splendor  and  power  of  her  government  has  been  in 
creased,  but  it  has  been  at  the  expense  of  the  happiness  of  her  people.  Strike 
out  of  existence  her  national  debt,  and  her  subjects  would  be  relieved  of  half 
their  burdens.  We  should  beware  lest,  while  we  imitate  her  example  in  ex 
tending  our  conquests,  and  annexing  additional  territory,  we  may  be  bringing 
upon  ourselves  and  our  children  the  evils  under  which  she  is  now  suffering. 
The  easy  payment  of  the  national  debt  after  the  late  war,  has  induced  the  be 
lief  with  some  that  no  danger  is  to  be  apprehended  from  that  source;  and  that 
no  matter  how  great  a  public  debt  we  may  create,  we  can  easily  discharge  it. 
Gentlemen  who  entertain  this  opinion  should  look  at  the  fact  that  our  Govern 
ment  was  then  cheaply  and  economically  administered.  Its  entire  annual  ex 
penditures  were  only  twelve  or  thirteen  millions  of  dollars,  while  now  they  are 
between  thirty  and  forty  millions,  aside  from  the  war  expenses.  The  interest 
upon  the  debt  we  are  creating  must  swell  them  even  beyond  this.  Our  expen 
ses  increase  in  a  more  rapid  ratio  than  our  resources.  I  fear,  sir,  that  we  are 
rapidly  approximating  the  period  when  direct  taxation  will  be  found  indis 
pensable. 

The  friends  of  the  Administration  tell  us  that  the  Mexican  war  is  popular,  and 
that  the  people  desire  its  prosecution.  If  they  believe  this,  why  do  they  not 
deal  fairly  and  candidly  with  the  people?  Why  do  they  not  tell  them,  if  the 


11 

war  is  to  be  continued,  the  people  must  pay  at  least  a  portion  of  its  expenses? 
Why  do  they  not  appeal  to  them  to  contribute  a  portion  of  their  means  to  sus 
tain  the  credit  of  the  Government,  and  enable  it  to  obtain  the  means  necessary 
for  the  "vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war?"  Sir,  they  know  well  that  the 
boasted  popularity  of  this  war  would  not  survive  the  first  visit  of  the  tax  col 
lector.  I  know,  sir,  that  the  patriotism  of  the  people  is  sufficient  to  induce 
them  to  submit  to  any  sacrifice  necessary  to  sustain  the  honor  of  the  country. 
Let  but  a  foreign  foe  be  found  upon  our  soil,  and  any  amount  of  taxation  would 
be  cheerfully  paid  which  would  be  necessary  to  repel  him.  But  I  do  not  be 
lieve  that  the  American  people  desire  to  contribute  their  means,  or  sacrifice  the 
fair  fame  of  the  country,  for  the  prosecution  of  an  aggressive  war,  in  a  foreign 
land,  with  the  object  of  conquest — to  acquire  territory  to  which  we  have  no 
right,  which  we  do  not  need,  and  which  could  be  of  no  possible  benefit  to  us  if 
we  should  obtain  it.  If  the  course  I  have  indicated  shall  not  be  pursued,  I  fear 
we  shall  soon  see  the  credit  of  the  Government  seriously  impaired,  and  a  de 
ficiency  of  means  to  carry  on  its  ordinary  operations.  But  I  will  say  no  more 
on  this  subject.  There  are  other  matters  to  which  I  wish  to  direct  my  atten 
tion  in  what  remains  of  my  time. 

It  would  afford  me  very  great  pleasure  to  hear  some  friend  of  the  Adminis 
tration — some  advocate  of  the  war — define  clearly  and  precisely  for  what  object 
it  is  to  be  further  prosecuted.  I  should  be  glad  if  the  President,  or  any  of  his 
friends,  would  point  out  clearly  the  line  of  operations  it  is  intended  to  pursue- 
We  have  heard  a  great  deal  said  about  the  necessity  of  prosecuting  the  war 
vigorously,  to  obtain  an  "honorable  peace."  All  certainly  desire  an  honorable 
peace  ;  but  when  gentlemen  urge  the  prosecution  of  the  war  for  that  object, 
why  do  they  not  inform  us  what  they  mean  by  an  "  honorable  peace?"  Do 
they  consider  no  peace  "honorable"  but  one  which  will  destroy  the  nationality 
of  Mexico  ?  Must  a  peace,  to  be  "honorable"  in  their  estimation,  require  the 
surrender  by  Mexico  of  half 'her  territory? 

There  is  another  phrase  very  frequently  used  as  indicative  of  the  designs  of 
the  Administration.  It  is  "indemnity  for  the  past,  and  security  for  the  future," 
and  is  about  as  unmeaning  and  unsatisfactory  to  explain  the  object  of  the  war?, 
as  the  "honorable  peace"  so  frequently  referred  to.  It  was  first  used  in  the 
President's  message,  and  has  since  become  the  common  watchword  of  his 
friends.  Ask  them  what  is  the  object  of  the  war,  and  they  are  ever  ready  with 
the  reply,  "indemnity  for  the  past,  and  security  for  the  future."  Perhaps 
we  can  uhderstand  what  is  meant  by  "indemnity  for  the  past."  But  what  is 
meant  by  this  cabalistic  phrase,  "'security  for  the  future?"  Is  security  for  the 
future  to  be  found  in  the  possession  of  all  Mexico?  Are  we  to  provide  against 
a  breach  of  the  peace  by  the  "annexation"  of  the  whole  country?  Are  we  to 
keep  the  country  quiet  by  the  continued  presence  of  a  large  military  force?  Or 
are  we  to  adopt  the  policy  which,  from  the  intimations  in  the  President's  mes 
sage,  would  seem  to  be  one  that  meets  his  approbation,  that  of  placing  in  power, 
in  Mexico,  an  administration  of  our  own  choice,  with  which  we  can  make  a 
treaty  on  our  own  terms,  and  then,  by  the  presence  of  our  armies,  compel  the 
people  of  Mexico  to  render  obedience  to  the  government  which  we  thus  force 
upon  them?  Are  our  rulers  already  so  wild  and  reckless  as  to  attempt  to  carry 
out  such  a  policy?  The  policy  is  not  a  new  one.  The  scheme  was  tried  by 
Napoleon  Bonaparte,  in  Spain,  when  he  overran  the  country  with  his  armies,, 
and  placed  his  brother  on  the  throne.  While  we  imitate  his  conduct,  we  should 
profit  by  his  example,  and  take  warning  by  his  fate.  If  we  undertake  to  carry 
out  this  system,  we  must  expect  to  keep  an  army  of  fifty  thousand  men  there 
for  at  least  twenty  years. 

The  course  of  the  President,  in  the  prosecution  of  this  war,  has  not  been 
such  as  should  characterize  the  Executive  of  a  free  government.  Instead  of 


frankness  and  candor  as  to  the  designs  of  the  Administration,  we  have 
-witnessed  continual  efforts  at  concealment.  Instead  of  precise  and  defi 
nite  statements  as  to  the  object  to  be  attained,  we  are  met  with  high- 
sounding,  general,  and  oracular  phrases,  as  unmeaning  and  indefinite  as 
the  Delphic  responses.  We  have  been  told  by  the  President,  while  the  same 
lesson  has  been  frequently  repeated  to  us  by  his  friends,  that  we  should  not 
discuss  the  origin  or  objects  of  the  war,  because,  by  doing  so  we  may  give 
"aid  and  comfort  to  the  enemy."  The  paid  organ  of  the  Administration  pours 
out  its  daily  round  of  abuse  of  Congress,  for  not  voting  at  once,  without  delay 
and  without  debate,  all  the  means  for  prosecuting  the  war  which  the  President 
desires.  We  have  called  upon  the  President,  by  a  resolution  of  the  House,  to 
inform  us  what  were  the  terms  upon  which  he  authorized  Mr.  Slidell  to  nego 
tiate  with  Mexico.  He  refuses  to  give  us  the  information,  and  tells  us,  in 
effect,  that  we  have  no  right  to  ask  him  such  questions. 

Shall  we,  then,  in  obedience  to  his  wishes,  in  ignorance  of  his  designs,  which 
-are  so  studiously  concealed  from  the  country,  submit  to  him  the  continued  pro 
secution  of  the  war,  as  long  as  he  may  desire  to  prosecute  it,  and  vote  to  raise 
new  armies  as  often  as  he  may  desire  them?  If  such  is  our  duty,  I  have  mis 
taken  the  character  of  our  Government. 

Very  shortly  after  the  commencement  of  the  war  I  expressed  my  opinion  on 
this  floor  of  its  origin  and  its  objects.  I  stated  then,  that  the  war  was  com 
menced  for  purposes  of  conquest,  and  that  it  would  not  be  suffered  to  end  until 
those  objects  were  accomplished.  Nearly  two  years  have  elapsed  since  then, 
•and  the  events  of  the  intervening  period  have  only  confirmed  my  opinions. 
Notwithstanding  the  repeated  assurances  of  the  President  and  his  friends,  that 
the  war  was  not  continued  with  any  design  of  conquest,  and  that  it  should  be 
terminated  as  soon  as  Mexico  would  agree  to  pay  the  indemnity  due  to  us,  he  has 
-himself  shown  in  his  late  message  that  such  assurances  are  entitled  to  no  credit. 

Mr.  Trist  was  sent  to  Mexico  last  summer  as  a  commissioner,  with  powers  to 
^negotiate  a  treaty  of  peace.  I  will  read  a  short  extract  from  the  President's  mes 
sage  of  December  last,  to  show  what  were  his  instructions.  The  President  says : 

"  The  boundary  of  the  Rio  Grande,  and  the  cession  to  the  United  States  of  New  Mexico  and 
Tipper  California,  constituted  an  ultimatum  which  our  commissioner  was  under  no  circumstances 
to  yield." 

We  are  thus  informed  by  the  President  that  he  determined  to  prosecute  the 
Tvar  for  the  acquisition  of  New  Mexico  and  Upper  California — at  least  one- 
third  of  the  whole  Mexican  territory.  His  language  is  direct  and  explicit,  and 
liable  to  no  misconstruction.  I  will  read,  now,  an  extract  from  his  annual 
message  of  December,  1846,  to  show  what  weie  the  views  he  then  expressed 
of  the  objects  for  which  the  war  should  be  further  prosecuted: 

"The  war  has  not  been  waged  with  a  view  to  conquest;  but,  having  been  commenced  by 
Mexico,  it  has  been  carried  into  the  enemy's  country,  and  will  be  vigorously  prosecuted  there, 
-with  a  view  to  obtain  an  honorable  peace,  and  thereby  secure  ample  indemnity  for  the  expenses 
of  the  war,  as  well  as  to  our  much  injured  citizens,  who  hold  large  pecuniary  demands  against 
Mexico." 

He  disavowed,  then,  any  design  of  conquest,  and  defined  the  terms  of  the 
"honorable  peace"  which  it  was  his  object  to  obtain,  as  indemnity  for  the  ex 
penses  of  the  war  and  the  claims  due  to  our  citizens.  Does  he  show,  now, 
that  he  was  willing  to  make  such  a  peace  as  he  had  himself  said  would  be 
"honorable?"  If  his  professions  of  a  desire  for  peace,  and  his  disavowal  of  a 
design  of  conquest,  made  last  year,  were  sincere,  he  would  have  authorized 
Mr.  Trist,  his  commissioner,  to  have  made  a  treaty  of  peace  whenever  Mexico 
would  agree  to  give  the  indemnity  which  he  himself  specified,  as  being  all  we 
had  any  right  to  demand.  But  did  he  give  Mr.  Trist  such  authority?  He  in 
structed  him  to  make  no  peace  with  Mexico  unless  she  would  agree  to 


13 

boundary  of  the  Rio  Grande,  and  the  cession  to  the  United  States  of  New  J 
and  Upper  California."  Had  we  any  right  to  demand  of  Mexico  the  cession  of. 
New  Mexico  and  California  ?  Did  the  President  believe  that  we  had  any  such 
right  ?  The  President  knew  well  that  we  had  no  such  right.  He  has  himself 
informed  us  that  those  provinces  were  estimated  to  be  of  a  greater  value  than 
the  amount  of  all  the  claims  which  he  supposed  we  had  against  Mexico,  even 
including  the  expenses  of  the  war.  Let  me  read  another  short  extract  from  his 
last  message,  to  show  what  are  his  opinions  on  this  point.  He  says : 

"  As  the  territory  to  be  acquired  by  the  boundary  proposed  might  be  estimated  to  be  of 
greater  value  than  a  fair  equivalent  for  our  just  demands,  our  commissioner  was  authorized  to 
stipulate  for  the  payment  of  such  additional  pecuniary  consideration  as  was  deemed  reasonable." 

He  does  not  now  authorize  Mr.  Trist  to  make  peace  when  Mexico  will  pay 
all  that  he  believes  to  be  our  just  demands,  including  all  the  expenses  of  the 
war.  But  he  insists  that  we  shall  continue  the  war  until  Mexico  cedes  to  us 
territory  which  he  admits  is  "of  greater  value  than  a  fair  equivalent  for  our  just 
demands." 

What  was  the  amount  of  the  ''pecuniary  consideration^  which  Mr.  Trist  was 
authorized  to  stipulate  for,  the  President  does  not  inform  us.  In  the  correspond 
ence  between  the  Mexican  commissioners  and  Mr.  Trist,  it  is  stated  at  twenty 
millions  of  dollars.  It  is  very  probable  that  that  was  the  amount  he  was  autho 
rized  to  offer. 

In  the  propositions  for  peace  which  were  made  by  the  Mexican  commission 
ers,  a  large  amount  of  territory  was  offered,  but  it  was  rejected  under  the  in 
structions  of  the  President.  Nothing  less  than  the  boundary  of  the  Rio  Grande, 
and  the  whole  of  New  Mexico  and  California,  would  be  received,  although  the 
President  admits  we  have  no  just  claim  to  them.  And  yet,  he  says,  he  enter 
tains  no  design  of  conquest.  Is  it  no  conquest  to  take  from  Mexico  her  terri 
tory  by  force,  when  at  the  same  time  we  admit  we  have  no  right  to  it  ? 
Does  the  offer  of  a  ''pecuniary  consideration97  change  the  character  of  the  trans 
action,  or  render  it  any  less  a  conquest  ?  We  keep  our  armies  within  her  terri 
tory,  we  sack  her  towns  and  bombard  her  cities,  we  slay  thousands  of  her  citi 
zens,  we  make  war  upon  her  in  every  conceivable  shape,  we  tell  her  that  this 
shall  be  continued  until  she  cedes  to  us  one-third  of  all  her  territory,  although 
at  the  same  time  we  admit  that  it  is  much  more  than  all  our  just  demands;  and 
yet  the  President,  while  doing  all  this,  gravely  informs  the  country  that  he  en 
tertains  no  design  of  conquest.  This  is  what  he  denominates  prosecuting  the 
war  for  indemnity. 

But,  Mr.  Speaker,  I  fear  the  designs  of  conquest  which  are  seriously  enter 
tained  are  not  limited  to  New  Mexico  and  Upper  California.  The  idea  of  in 
corporating  the  whole  of  Mexico  into  the  American  Union  is  more  than  hinted 
at  from  high  quarters  among  the  supporters  of  the  Administration.  Such  a  de 
sign  will  not  be  openly  avowed,  particularly  before  the  Presidential  election, 
lest  the  people  shall  take  the  alarm,  and  adopt  effectual  means  to  prevent  the 
consummation  of  so  fatal  a  measure.  I  have  before  me  a  speech,  made  but  a  few 
days  since  in  the  other  end  of  the  Capitol,  by  a  gentleman  who  stands  upon  con 
fidential  terms  with  the  Administration.  I  will  read  an  extract  from  it.  He  says  r 

"  There  are  numerous  cases,  all  tending  to  the  same  point,  that  whenever  it  becomes  impracti 
cable  to  obtain  territory  by  purchase,  WE  TAKE  IT  BY  FORCE.  All  that  strip  of  country  lying  be 
tween  Natchez  and  Baton"  Rouge  was  taken  possession  of  in  that  way.  And  we  have  done  so 
in  all  cases  when  we  could  not  obtain  territory  by  negotiation  ;  and  this  course  has  been  pursued 
throughout  the  world,  in  all  times,  by  aH  Powers.'5 

This  is  from  a  speech  made  by  the  Chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations  in  the  Senate,  (Mr.  SEVIER,)  delivered  on  the  24th  January  last. 
The  honorable  Chairman  here  openly  avows  the  intention  to  take  the  territory 
of  Mexico  by  force,  and  justifies  it  upon  the  ground  that  such  has  been  the 
practice  throughout  the  world. 


14 

I  will  also  read  an  extract  from  another  speech,  made  in  the  same  body 
during  the  present  session  of  Congress: 

"  I  repeat.,  what  I  before  said,  that  the  longer  Mexico  continues  her  obstinate  rejection  of 
reasonable  indemnity,  and  the  greater  exertion  she  compels  us  to  make,  the  greater  will  be  our 
demands,  and  the  heavier  her  losses.  What  we  would  have  accepted  last  year,  or  even  at  the 
commencement  of  the  present  campaign,  we  may  well  refuse  now ;  and  what  we  would  accept 
now,  we  may  well  refuse  after  a  few  months.  And  how  much  the  public  sentiment  of  this 
country  may  demand  a  year  or  two  hence,  if  the  war  continues  so  long,  I  do  not  pretend  to  pre 
dict.  We  may  have  to  make  the  great  experiment  so  dreaded  by  the  Senator  from  South  Caro 
lina,  and  the  Senator  from  Kentucky,  and  annex  the  domains  of  Mexico  to  our  own.  This  is 
«Jie  penalty  which  national  injustice  has  often  been  compelled  to  pay,  and  which  Mexico  may 
be  preparing  for  herself." 

This  extract  is  from  the  speech  of  a  gentleman  (Mr.  CASS)  who  it  is  gener 
ally  believed  will  be  the  candidate  of  the  Democratic  party  for  the  Presidency. 
The  policy  here  marked  out  may  be  regarded  as  the  foreshadowing  of  the  course 
to  be  pursued  in  the  event  of  his  election.  The  indemnity  to  be  demanded 
from  Mexico  is  to  be  increased  in  proportion  to  her  obstinacy.  What  would 
have  satisfied  us  a  few  months  ago,  must  not  satisfy  us  now.  The  longer  we 
protract  the  war,  the  more  of  her  provinces  must  we  take.  With  every  addi 
tional  month  our  demands  must  be  increased,  until  we  reach  the  point  of  an 
nexing  the  entire  country. 

[A  gentleman  sitting  near  Mr.  SMITH  remarked,  in  an  under  tone,  "that  is 
progressive  Democracy."] 

Yes,  said  Mr.  S.,  it  is  "progressive  Democracy,"  with  a  vengeance.  De 
mocracy  is  indeed  progressing  at  a  fearful  rate.  When  the  annexation  of 
Texas  was  first  proposed,  Democracy  shrunk  back  affrighted.  Now  it  contem 
plates,  with  complacency,  the  conquest  and  annexation  of  a  country  with  nine 
millions  of  inhabitants. 

Can  any  one  doubt,  from  the  evidences  before  us,  that  we  are  rapidly  hasten 
ing  to  that  "great  experiment"  to  which  Mr.  CASS  refers?  The  object  will  not 
be  openly  avowed;  the  country  will  still  be  deluded  with  the  hopes  of  peace 
until  after  the  Presidential  election;  and  then,  should  the  Democracy  elect 
their  candidate,  the  mask  will  be  thrown  aside,  and  the  annexation  of  Mexico 
openly  advocated.  Then,  that  "public  sentiment,"  to  which  General  CASS  re 
fers,  will  be  invoked  in  aid  of  the  measure. 

I  do  not  believe  that  the  Administration  has  any  desire  to  negotiate  a  peace 
with  Mexico.  I  have  no  expectation  that  any  treaty  will  be  made  before  the 
Presidential  election.  For  several  days  the  city  has  been  filled  with  rumors  of 
a  treaty  negotiated  by  Mr.  Trist.  The  letter  writers  from  this  city  have  filled 
the  press  with  statements  of  the  prospect  of  successful  negotiations.  The  plea 
sure  every  where  manifested  by  the  public  at  these  rumors — the  avidity  with 
which  they  are  caught  up  and  repeated  all  over  the  country — proves  the  anxiety 
for  peace  which  exists  with  the  people.  With  people  of  all  political  parties, 
the  same  ardent  wishes  for  the  termination  of  the  war  are  expressed.  But  the 
hopes  excited  by  these  rumors  are  doomed  to  disappointment.  Ever  since  the 
commencement  of  the  war,  the  cry  of  peace  has  been  raised.  After  each  suc 
cessive  victory  won  by  our  armies,  the  same  syren  song  has  been  sung,  the 
same  dulcet  notes  have  been  sounded,  but  yet  peace  came  not.  There  has 
been  a  continual  cry  of  "peace,  peace,  when  there  was  no  peace." 

The  President's  organ,  since  the  rumors  of  Mr.  Trist's  negotiations  have 
been  so  rife,  has  stated,  explicitly,  that  all  such  rumors  are  without  founda 
tion.  It  is  well  understood  here  that,  notwithstanding  Mr.  Trist's  powers 
to  negotiate  have  been  revoked,  the  Mexican  authorities  have  made  proposi 
tions  to  negotiate  with  him;  that  they  are  anxious  for  peace,  and  would  bo 
willing  to  obtain  it  even  at  the  price  of  the  territory  which  the  President 
says  he  authorized  Mr.  Trist  to  receive.  It  is  apparent,  however,  that  the 
Administration  has  no  desire  to  make  peace,  even  upon  those  terms.  The 
most  violent  abuse  has  been  visited  upon  Mr.  Trist,  by  his  own  party  friends, 


15 

for  remaining  in  Mexico,  or  for  suffering  anything  to  be  said  to  him  about  peace 
by  the  Mexican  authorities.  It  is  said,  also,  upon  the  authority  of  various 
sources  of  information,  that  Gen.  Scott  is  ardently  favorable  to  peace,  and 
anxious  to  promote  it  with  all  the  influence  of  his  name  and  position.  This 
may,  perhaps,  in  some  measure,  account  for  the  hostility  of  the  Administration 
towards  him.  I  should  be  glad  to  ascertain  what  connection  there  may  be  be 
tween  this  and  the  late  extraordinary  movement  of  the  Administration,  in  re- 
moving  him  from  the  command  of  the  army,  and  subjecting  him  to  a  trial  be 
fore  a  board  of  inferior  officers.  The  truth  is,  the  Administration  neither  ex 
pects  nor  desires  peace.  Any  hopes  of  an  early  peace  which  may  be  enter 
tained  by  the  people  will  be  disappointed.  The  ignis  fatuus  of  peace,  so  con 
stantly  held  up  before  them,  will  still  elude  their  grasp.  No  peace  need  be  ex 
pected,  unless  the  people  shall  express  their  desire  for  it,  in  such  terms  as  will 
compel  the  Administration  to  abandon  their  designs  of  conquest. 

If  the  Administration  really  and  sincerely  desired  peace,  it  would  be  an  easy 
task  to  obtain  it.  I  believe  that  peace,  an  "honorable  peace,"  may  be  obtain 
ed  in  sixty  days — a  peace  just  to  Mexico  and  honorable  to  ourselves — a  peace 
which  would  testify  to  the  world  our  magnanimity  and  sense  of  justice,  as  our 
brilliant  victories  have  already  shown  our  heroic  courage  and  skill  in  war.  Let 
the  President  appoint  commissioners — not  one  of  the  clerks  of  a  Department — 
but  men  of  high  standing  and  character,  no  matter  to  what  political  party  they 
may  belong — men  known  to  the  country,  and  whose  character  as  statesmen 
would  furnish  a  guaranty  of  the  upright  and  honorable  intentions  of  the  Govern 
ment.  Let  the  Administration  renounce  its  wild  schemes  of  conquest,  and  through 
such  men  as  these  propose  terms  of  peace,  just  and  honorable,  and,  my  word  for 
it,  we  shall  have  peace  at  once.  Let  us  demand  from  Mexico  all  that  we  have 
a  right,  in  truth  and  justice,  to  demand,  and  nothing  more.  Let  us  not  insist 
on  the  cession  of  territory  which  the  President  himself  tells  us  is  more  than 
"our  just  demands."  Let  us  not  insist  on  demands  which  our  own  Govern 
ment  admits  are  unjust. 

Mr.  SAWYER  here  interposed,  and  asked  Mr.  SMITH  what  were  the  terms 
we  ought  to  offer. 

Mr.  SMITH  replied,  it  is  for  those  who  have  the  control  of  the  Government 
to  propose  the  terms.  The  Administration  should  inform  the  country  explicitly 
upon  what  terms  it  is  willing  to  make  peace.  I  have  already  stated,  in  gen 
eral  terms,  what  propositions  we  should  make.  I  repudiate  entirely  the  pre 
tence  set  up,  that  we  should  demand  of  Mexico  the  expenses  of  the  war. 
The  House  has  decided  that  the  war  was  "unnecessarily  and  unconstitution 
ally"  commenced.  If  this  be  true,  upon  what  pretext  can  we  claim  that  Mex 
ico  should  pay  the  expenses  of  its  prosecution?  This  higgling  with  Mexico 
for  the  cost  of  the  powrder  burnt  in  bombarding  her  cities  is  disreputable  to  the 
nation.  What  were  our  claims  before  the  war  begun?  We  insisted  upon 
having  Texas,  with  such  boundaries  as  she  was  fairly  entitled  to.  Mexico  was 
indebted  to  us,  by  treaty,  some  two  millions  of  dollars.  Besides  this,  there 
were  unliquidated  claims  for  spoliations,  the  precise  amount  of  which  has  never 
been  ascertained.  These  constituted  all  our  claims  before  the  war.  We  set 
up  no  claim  then  to  any  of  the  territory  of  Mexico  beyond  Texas.  All  we 
then  asked  was  that  Mexico  should  acquiesce  in  the  annexation  of  Texas,  settle 
and  define  her  boundary,  and  pay  the  claims  which  we  held  against  her.  Has 
the  existence  of  the  war  increased  our  just  demands?  If  the  war  was  com 
menced  as  we  have  decided,  by  an  aggressive  movement  of  the  President,  it 
is  very  clear  that  it  has  not.  Our  rights  now  are  no  greater  than  they  were 
before  the  war  began. 

If,  however,  the  Administration  "intends  to  hold  and  retain  permanently 
New  Mexico  and  California — acknowledging  at  the  same  time  that  they  con 
stitute  a  larger  measure  of  indemnity  than  we  have  any  just  right  to  demand — 


16 

•why  not  hold  those  provinces,  and  withdraw  our  forces  from  the  other  portions 
of  Mexico?  Why  shall  we  keep  an  army  of  fifty  thousand  men  in  the  heart 
of  Mexico,  preying  upon  the  vitals  of  the  country,  when  with  ten  thousand  men 
we  can  hold  all  that  the  Administration  pretends  it  wishes  to  retain?  Five  thou 
sand  troops  in  New  Mexico,  and  an  equal  number  in  Upper  California,  would 
hold  those  provinces  against  all  the  force  which  Mexico  can  bring  into  the  field. 

There  must  be,  ulterior  designs  beyond  the  mere  acquisition  of  those  prov 
inces.  If  that,  in  truth,  is  all  that  the  Administration  desires  or  intends  to  ac 
quire,  there  is  wisdom  and  sound  policy  in  the  course  marked  out  by  the  dis 
tinguished  Senator  from  South  Carolina,  (Mr.  CALHOUN.)  By  adopting  that 
policy,  three-fourths  of  the  immense  expense  we  are  now  incurring  might  be 
avoided,  and  the  further  effusion  of  blood  might  be  stayed. 

I  fear  there  is  but  one  remedy  for  these  evils,  and  that  is  in  the  hands  of 
the  people.  The  people  must  place  the  power  of  the  Government  in  the  hands 
of  men  of  different  principles.  The  time  is  approaching  when  they  will  have 
the  opportunity  of  applying  this  remedy,  and  I  trust  it  will  be  applied. 

I  am  forced  to  the  belief,  Mr.  Speaker,  that  the  whole  policy  of  the  Admin 
istration,  as  connected  with  the  war,  has  been  characterized  by  a  want  of  sin 
cerity  and  fair  dealing  towards  the  country.  Had  the  design  to  bring  on  this 
war  been  known  or  avowed,  it  would  have  been  prevented.  But  amid  contin 
ued  professions  of  a  desire  for  peace,  and  the  avoidance  of  causes  of  hostility, 
the  war  was  stealthily  brought  on,  while  the  country  was  carefully  kept  in 
ignorance  of  the  danger  of  hostilities,  until  the  blaze  of  the  battle-fields  in 
Mexico  exposed  to  us  the  fact  that  war  existed.  Had  the  last  Congress,  with 
its  strong  Democratic  majority,  resorted  to  the  means  of  raising  revenue  for 
its  prosecution,  which  the  exigency  demanded,  the  boasted  popularity  of  the 
war  would  before  this  time  have  vanished. 

It  was  my  fortune  to  have  a  seat  on  this  floor  at  the  time  Texas  was  annexed. 
I  opposed  this  measure,  believing  that  it  would  be  the  source  of  evils  of  great 
magnitude.  Those  who  urged  it  upon  us  assured  us  that  it  would  not  produce 
war,  and  at  the  session  of  Congress  after  its  annexation,  the  President  con 
gratulated  the  country  that  it  was  a  bloodless  achievement.  The  very  same 
gentlemen,  who  then  assured  us  that  the  annexation  of  Texas  would  not  pro 
duce  war,  now  attempt  to  defend  the  President  from  the  charge  that  he  com 
menced  the  war,  by  the  assertion  that  the  annexation  of  Texas  produced  the 
war.  The  position  assumed  now  is  not  very  consistent  with  the  one  assumed  then. 

But  we  have  Texas,  and  there  let  us  stop.  If  we  can  succeed  in  wringing 
from  the  distress  and  suffering  of  Mexico,  a  cession  of  more  of  her  territory,, 
every  foot  which  we  thus  acquire  will  prove  a  curse  and  a  calamity  to  us.  It 
is  a  great  mistake  to  suppose  that  by  the  extension  of  our  territory  we  shall 
increase  our  power  or  our  greatness  j  more  especially  when  that  extension  is 
effected  by  force  and  violence.  History  furnishes  no  single  instance  of  a  na 
tion  deriving  benefit  or  advantage  from  an  extension  of  its  dominion  by  force 
and  conquest.  We  cannot  form  an  exception  to  the  rule. 

I  believe,  Mr.  Speaker,  wre  are  approaching  a  crisis  which  is  to  be  decisive 
of  the  fate  of  our  Government.  We  cannot  shut  our  eyes  to  the  alarming  dan 
gers  of  the  career  of  conquest  upon  which  we  have  entered.  If  it  shall  not  be 
arrested,  it  must  be  fatal  to  our  Union.  The  denationalization  of  Mexico,  and 
its  annexation  to  this  Republic,  would  be  destructive  of  our  Government. 
Whoever  may  live  to  see  that  event,  will,  in  all  probability,  survive  the  glori 
ous  Union  of  these  United  States. 


